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5AB
ST
R
AC
T For many years, comparative welfare state research has 
been afflicted with a sort of methodological nationalism 
in the sense that countries were treated as independent 
units. In line with the recent ‘spatial turn’ in comparative 
public policy studies, this paper examines with regard to 
three welfare state programmes whether, in the post-
war period, the provision of social rights in 18 Western 
democracies was shaped by benefit generosity in other 
countries. We show that diffusion is present but varies by 
programme and over time. Rather surprisingly, we find 
that policy diffusion was particularly relevant during the 
Golden Age.
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7Introduction
Today, the welfare state is a constitutive 
element of the modern state that attracts 
approximately 50 per cent of total public 
expenditure in virtually all advanced de-
mocracies. Much of the dramatic growth 
of the welfare state in the course of the 
20th century took place within a rela-
tively short period that, in retrospect, 
is quite frequently glorified as a Golden 
Age. Stretching over the period between 
1945 and ca. 1975, this era was character-
ised by unprecedented economic growth, 
relatively closed economies and, there-
fore, considerable autonomy for national 
policy-makers (Scharpf, 2000). In conse-
quence, the post-war period witnessed a 
significant extension of social rights to 
new groups of beneficiaries, higher lev-
els of benefit generosity, eased eligibility 
rules, and the introduction of new pro-
grammes such as family cash benefits or 
social services. While numerous empiri-
cal studies have examined the domestic 
forces driving these developments, very 
little attention was paid to the issue of 
whether welfare state development and 
welfare generosity in the post-war period 
was influenced by spatial interdependen-
cies between nations. This is astonishing 
since there is considerable evidence that 
social policy choices are not implemented 
independently of each other and a policy 
choice in one country may depend on the 
policy choices of other nations (e.g. Col-
lier & Messick, 1975; Rodgers, 1998). 
This paper explicitly focuses on spa-
tial interdependencies between countries 
for explaining benefit generosity between 
1960 and 2000 in 18 advanced welfare 
states. 1  The main objective is to provide 
a first empirical test of whether, and if so, 
in which ways, spatial interdependencies 
have shaped the generosity of welfare 
states. Our inquiry makes a novel contri-
bution to the literature in the following 
respect. Using data from the Social Citi-
zenship Indicator Program (SCIP), we ex-
amine with regard to three welfare state 
programmes (pensions, unemployment 
compensation, and sickness cash bene-
fits) whether policy diffusion accounts for 
the extent of welfare state generosity in 
the post-war period. This research ques-
tion has been widely neglected by the ex-
isting literature, which, by now, has only 
examined the impact of spatial interde-
pendencies on social spending and unem-
ployment benefits since the 1980s, i.e. in 
a period that is characterised by welfare 
cutbacks and welfare state recalibration. 
On average, the three programmes 
under scrutiny absorbed about 71 per-
cent of public social expenditure in our 
18 countries in 2007 (OECD, 2010). How-
ever, we use benefit levels offered by 
these programmes as dependent variable 
1 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Swit-
zerland, United Kingdom, United States.
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because social expenditure is ”epiphe-
nomenal to the theoretical substance of 
welfare states“ (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 
p. 19). The programme-related net re-
placement rates calculated by SCIP rep-
resent the best indicator available meas-
uring welfare generosity and reflect the 
degree to which social entitlements are 
granted as a matter of social rights (Korpi 
& Palme, 2003, pp. 432-33; Stephens, pp. 
2010: 515-16). Since benefit generosity 
is a politically controlled output measure 
we can assume that national benefit levels 
are possibly influenced by the decisions 
made by other governments. In fact, our 
findings suggest that spatial interdepend-
encies do exist, but vary by programme as 
well as over time. 
The paper is organised as follows. We 
commence with a brief literature review 
and show that only few cross-national 
comparative studies have to date shed 
light on the impact of spatial interde-
pendencies on welfare state development. 
Next, we theoretically discuss the role of 
policy diffusion in this process and illus-
trate the underlying causal mechanisms. 
The following section presents the empiri-
cal findings, while the final section con-
cludes.
A Brief Literature Review
The dramatic expansion of the welfare 
state in the post-war period very soon 
attracted the interest of social scientists 
who attempted to understand the fac-
tors underlying this development. This 
endeavour was facilitated by early data 
availability with national social expendi-
ture featuring as the main dependent 
variable for many years. Social spending 
was even seen as a synonym for national 
‘welfare efforts’ in the functionalist ac-
counts of the 1950s and 1960s (Wilensky, 
1975). From the 1980s onwards, however, 
mostly Scandinavian scholars argued that 
the focus on expenditure involved a “non-
theoretical conceptualization” of the wel-
fare state (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi 
& Palme, 2003, p. 426). With reference to 
T.H. Marshall, these scholars suggested to 
pay more attention to the extent to which 
social entitlements are granted as a mat-
ter of right. Eligibility conditions and ben-
efit levels rather than social expenditure 
were the primary focus of these scholars 
and their interest in the provision of social 
rights motivated the Social Citizenship In-
dicator Programme. Though publications 
based on SCIP data began appearing in 
1989, the dataset was not publicly avail-
able until 2007 (Stephens 2010: 517). 
9Hence social expenditure continued to 
play a prominent role as dependent vari-
able in comparative welfare state research 
up to the present day. 
What the empirical inquiries of both 
approaches have in common, however, is 
that they have typically treated nations as 
independent units and, in consequence, 
neglected spatial interdependencies. This 
is not to say that international influences 
were wholly ignored. International im-
pacts on domestic policies were typically 
controlled for in quantitative inquiries by 
additional right-hand side variables meas-
uring trade openness, financial market de-
regulation or EU-membership. But this is 
very long way from modelling interactions 
between countries in an explicit manner. 
In contrast, the notion that national 
social policies might be influenced by 
social legislation adopted in other coun-
tries featured prominently in comparative 
studies that focused on the cross-national 
differences in the temporal adoption of 
social security legislation. These scholars 
quite early on assumed that governments 
did not implement welfare reforms inde-
pendently from each other. Apart from the 
impact of domestic factors, these schol-
ars were concerned with the question of 
whether programme adoption was stimu-
lated by the social legislation established 
in pioneer nations. The locus classicus 
is a paper by Collier and Messick (1975) 
which not only pointed to the prevalence 
of Galton’s problem in comparative wel-
fare state research, but also conducted an 
(exploratory) empirical analysis of pro-
gramme diffusion in 59 countries. They 
found evidence of diffusion in the sense 
that late adopters could be shown to have 
introduced their first welfare programme 
at lower levels of modernisation by imi-
tating the social security programmes 
of pioneer countries (1975, p. 1300). 2 
A few years later, Alber (1982, p. 134ff) 
and Kuhnle (1981) examined the spread 
of Bismarckian social insurance across 
Western European countries and conclud-
ed that German social insurance legisla-
tion was hardly a successful export article 
(Alber, 1982, p. 143). Yet the commend-
able efforts of these pioneers faced severe 
constraints imposed by the lack of appro-
priate statistical methods and technical 
limitations in terms of data processing. 
For example, the scatterplots reported 
by Collier and Messick (1975) and Alber 
(1982) were still drawn by hand and the 
empirical analysis relied on simple cor-
relations. Thanks to methodological and 
technical advances, however, these prob-
lems have been resolved and recent years 
have witnessed a sort of ‘spatial turn’ in 
comparative public policy (e.g. Simmons 
& Elkins, 2004; Gilardi et al., 2009, 2010; 
Franzese & Hays, 2007, 2008) 3  Compara-
tive welfare state research is no exception 
in terms of a growing interest in spatial in-
teractions between countries. Jahn (2006, 
2009) has examined the impact of globali-
sation on social expenditure by weighting 
2 British polymath Sir Francis Galton pointed in 
1889 to the problem that units of observations are 
not necessarily independent ones. Comparative 
analysis is particularly afflicted with this problem 
due to interdependencies between countries or 
societies (Goldthorpe, 1997, p. 9).
3 In addition, there are several studies dating back 
to the 1970s which deal with the diffusion of social 
welfare policies in individual states of the U.S. (e.g. 
Gray, 1973).
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social spending with bilateral trade as a 
share of a country’s total trade volume. 
He found an increasing importance of dif-
fusion over time combined with a race to 
the bottom in social spending in the 1990s 
(Jahn, 2006, 2009). He concludes that “in-
ternational, not domestic, imperatives in-
creasingly determine social policy” (Jahn 
2006, p. 426). Franzese and Hays (2006) 
have shown for EU countries that spend-
ing decisions of neighbouring countries 
are interdependent. Higher expenditure 
devoted to active labour market pro-
grammes creates an incentive to free ride 
on the spending behaviour of neighbour-
ing countries. Kemmerling (2007) also in-
vestigated patterns of diffusion in labour 
market policy in rich democracies using 
the ratio of active and passive labour mar-
ket spending as the dependent variable. 
In line with Franzese and Hays (2006), he 
found a negative short-term influence be-
tween countries sharing a common bor-
der. He argues that this effect is triggered 
by positive externalities between neigh-
bouring countries. However, other diffu-
sion mechanisms such as relative policy 
success (measured by the difference of 
the unemployment rate between coun-
tries) remained statistically insignificant. 
Other studies have examined the 
spread of particular welfare state reforms 
across countries. Gilardi et al. (2009) 
show that the introduction of diagnosis 
related groups (DRGs) in the hospital sec-
tor can be attributed to policy diffusion. 
Brooks (2007) obtained similar findings 
with regard to the proliferation of funded 
defined-contribution pensions among 
middle-income economies. 
To date, only two studies have in-
vestigated possible impacts of diffusion 
on benefit generosity. However, both of 
them only refer to the post-Golden Age 
period. Kemmerling (2007) examined 
the determinants of the net replacement 
rate offered by unemployment insurance 
but did not find any significant spatial 
effects for the period between 1971 and 
2002. Gilardi (2010) also focused on the 
retrenchment of unemployment benefits 
in a sample of 18 OECD countries. He 
was particularly concerned with the role 
of policy learning and obtained empirical 
evidence that learning among countries is 
conditioned by the ideological positions of 
policy actors and their beliefs about likely 
electoral reform consequences. No other 
previous cross-national studies dealing 
with the determinants of welfare generos-
ity have modelled spatial interdependen-
cies in an explicit manner (e.g. Korpi & 
Palme, 2003; Allen & Scruggs, 2004, Huo, 
Nelson, et al., 2008; Swank, 2005).
In sum, this short literature review has 
revealed two shortcomings. First, the only 
kind of welfare benefits analysed by this 
research so far relate to unemployment 
insurance. Second, no research has ex-
amined the question of whether spatial in-
terdependencies influenced benefit gen-
erosity during the Golden Age. In sum, 
a verdict by Collier and Messick (1975, 
p. 1305) is still true today: “Although 
the literature on social security provides 
considerable evidence that diffusion is 
present, only limited attention has been 
given to systematic analyses of patterns 
of diffusion”.
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Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion and their 
Relevance for Welfare State Generosity
The basic assumption in the policy dif-
fusion literature is that political actors 
do not implement policies independently 
of each other (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000; 
Franzese & Hays, 2007). Diffusion de-
notes a process in which the adoption of 
a certain policy in one or more countries 
leads to policy changes in other countries 
(Strang, 1991). Even though diffusion and 
spatial interdependencies are often used 
synonymously, we regard spatial inter-
dependencies as precondition for policy 
diffusion. But why should a national gov-
ernment be concerned with social policy 
decisions taken in other countries? And 
why should we expect spatial interde-
pendencies when it comes to welfare gen-
erosity in the first place? 
Different strands of literature discuss 
a wide range of distinct but closely related 
mechanisms that may promote policy dif-
fusion. These mechanisms include lesson 
drawing (Rose, 1993), policy oriented 
learning (Sabatier, 1987), social learning 
(Hall, 1993), Bayesian learning (Meseg-
uer, 2009), emulation or competition 
(Dobbin et al., 2007). By now, a system-
atic integration of and a sharp discrimi-
nation between these different concepts 
is missing at the theoretical as well as at 
the empirical level. To some extent, they 
are based upon different ontological as-
sumptions and some are competing while 
others are complementary. However, the 
main intention of this paper is not to test 
the different mechanisms underlying 
policy diffusion but rather to investigate 
whether there is empirical evidence for 
the presence of policy diffusion at differ-
ent stages of welfare state development.
The quantitative international com-
parative literature typically distinguishes 
between the following mechanisms that 
may lead to policy diffusion among na-
tions (Elkins & Simmons, 2004).
Learning and emulation 4 denote that 
governments draw lessons from policies 
which have turned out to be successful 
or inappropriate elsewhere or mimic the 
policy trends prevalent within their peer 
group. Learning and emulation require 
information related to best practice or 
policy failure. A prerequisite for this to 
happen is cross-national communication. 
With respect to social policy there is, in 
fact, considerable evidence that already 
the period of welfare state formation was 
characterised by a significant exchange 
of information. International congresses 
of experts, unions and workers, govern-
mental commissions studying social leg-
islation abroad are indicative of dense 
international networks of communication 
that even stretched across continents 
(Rodgers, 1998) and contributed to the 
spread of knowledge about social institu-
4 Usually, learning and emulation are discussed 
separately in the literature. However, empirical 
research suffers from considerable difficulties in 
discriminating clearly among these two mecha-
nisms (Gilardi, 2010, p. 650). We therefore take a 
pragmatic view by pulling them together.
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tions, programmes and policies. After its 
foundation in 1919, for example, the ILO 
became a “promoter of international best 
practice” as it “passed a large number of 
norm-setting conventions and recommen-
dations in all fields of social insurance” 
(Kuhnle & Sander, 2010, p. 78). During the 
post-war period, the progress in terms of 
communication technologies, Europeani-
sation and, more recently, globalisation 
considerably increased communication 
flows between nations and thus the prob-
ability of policy learning across space.
Competition emphasizes the strate-
gic behaviour of governments related to 
economic competition. The basic assump-
tion is that countries particularly look at 
those nations with which they compete 
and adjust their strategy to the competi-
tor’s choice (Lee & Strang, 2006, p. 890). 
While anything but new, it can be argued 
that the changes in the international po-
litical economy over the past decades 
have increasingly put countries under 
pressure to respond to the economic and 
social policies adopted in other countries. 
Particularly the tax and welfare state is 
seen to be exposed to international mar-
ket pressure. More specifically, interna-
tional competition is assumed to promote 
policies designed to attract foreign capital 
and international business (Dobbin et al., 
2007; Simmons & Elkins, 2004). If, for ex-
ample, a competing country raises its so-
cial standards, the rival has an incentive 
to defect in order to reap a competitive 
advantage resulting from lower labour 
costs. The same economic rationale im-
plicates that any retrenchment of welfare 
benefits in a given country puts compet-
ing countries under strain to adopt a simi-
lar policy. In other words, welfare state 
generosity is a strategic cue ball of eco-
nomic competition. However, competition 
does not necessarily implicate a race to 
the bottom. It is, for example, conceivable 
that countries increase benefit generos-
ity in order to attract high-skilled labour. 
Another instance of a race to the top is 
regime competition during the Cold War 
(Obinger & Schmitt, 2011). 
A further mechanism of policy diffu-
sion emphasised in the literature is co-
ercion. It occurs “whenever an external 
political forces a government to adopt a 
certain policy” (Holzinger & Knill, 2005, 
p. 781). However, coercion is rather un-
likely to occur in advanced democracies 
as it presupposes asymmetric power re-
lations. Even though contemporary EU 
conditionality vis-à-vis Greece is a major 
exception, coercion did not play a great 
role in the past in our sample of long-term 
democracies. 
Overall, two hypotheses are exam-
ined. First, we assume that diffusion has 
shaped benefit generosity of advanced 
welfare states in the post-war period. Giv-
en the increase in information flows and 
growing economic integration over time, 
we assume, secondly, that policy diffusion 
is more pronounced in the aftermath of 
the Golden Age.
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Data and Method
Our dependent variable is the net re-
placement rate for an average production 
worker (APW) offered by three welfare 
state programmes, namely old age pen-
sions, work accident, sickness and unem-
ployment insurance. Data is taken from 
the Social Citizenship Indicator Program 
(Korpi & Palme, 2007) and available for 
18 OECD countries and 5-years intervals 
between 1950 and 2000. Benefits offered 
by the three programmes under consid-
eration are granted through national leg-
islation and include collectively bargained 
programmes provided that (i) the state 
contributes to programme financing or 
(ii) the programme came into existence 
through a law. 5  Since replacement rates 
may vary by family status and benefit 
duration, we followed Korpi and Palme 
(2003, p. 443) and calculated a replace-
ment rate that reflects the average of four 
components (i.e. the replacement rate for 
a single person vs. a four-person family 
and short term vs. long term benefit gen-
erosity). The replacement rate of pensions 
is the average of the APW replacement 
rate for a single person and a couple. 6 
5 See The Social Citizenship Indicator Program 
(SCIP). General Coding Comments (Code-
book, see https://dspace.it.su.se/dspace/bit-
stream/10102/1522/1/Codebook.pdf).
6 Even though net replacement rates are 
influenced by the tax system and refer to model 
households, we are convinced that they represent 
a much better indicator of welfare generosity than 
social spending.
Figure 1 shows for 18 democracies the 
development of the average benefit gen-
erosity offered by the three programmes 
between 1955 and 2000. Although these 
charts mask substantial cross-national dif-
ferences, one can see a clear turning point 
in all programmes between 1975 and 
1985.  After a period of a marked expan-
sion of welfare state generosity, almost all 
countries have, albeit to a different extent, 
imposed benefit cutbacks since the late 
1970s (Korpi & Palme, 2003). The exist-
ence of a clear turning point motivated us 
to distinguish between two sub-periods in 
the subsequent empirical analysis.
We use spatial econometrics to ex-
amine whether policy diffusion accounts 
for national trajectories. Spatial interde-
pendencies can be modelled by including 
a spatial term as a regressor (spatial lag 
model) (Anselin, 2003). The general spa-
tio-temporal autoregressive model (STAR) 
can be expressed as follows:
(1)
where y is the replacement rate, (rho) is a 
spatial autoregressive coefficient and W*y 
the weighted average of the dependent 
variable (spatial lag). The spatial weight 
matrix W is a matrix with N x T rows and 
N x T columns. Each cell represents the 
degree of connectivity between two coun-
tries at a specific point in time. The effect 
 εβφρ ++⋅+⋅= XMyWyy
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on a focal country is the weighted sum of 
outcomes across countries (Lee & Strang, 
2006). M*y denotes the lagged dependent 
variable and X is a set of exogenous ex-
planatory variables. 
Before analysing the different diffu-
sion mechanisms, we need to establish 
whether there is spatial association in the 
dependent variable. Moran’s I as a meas-
ure of global spatial autocorrelation indi-
cates spatial correlation for all estimated 
models. 
True spatial interdependence has 
to becarefully distinguished from other 
sources of spatial association. Spatial pat-
terns in the dependent variable resulting 
from cross-national interdependencies 
occur because countries interact with oth-
ers. Spatial patterns, however, might also 
be caused by common shocks, by tempo-
ral trends or by unobserved spatial heter-
ogeneity. For example, an external shock 
might force nations to react in similar 
ways. Another possible source of spatial 
patterns is that similar national precondi-
tions drive countries to move in the same 
direction. The only way of disentangling 
spatial interdependence from its alterna-
tives is to model them and include appro-
priate right hand side variables (Franzese 
& Hays, 2007, 2008; Plümper & Neumay-
er, 2010, p.  215). A failure to account for 
such alternatives will bias the spatial lag 
coefficient. To control for common shocks, 
we added year dummies. Furthermore, a 
lagged dependent variable captures com-
mon trends and temporal dynamics. In-
cluding a lagged dependent variable has 
the disadvantage of accounting for the 
largest part of the variance in the depend-
ent variable and of absorbing the explana-
tory power of the other substantial right 
hand variables. However, the focus of this 
paper is to guarantee reliable results for 
the spatial lags and not to identify the sub-
stantive influence of the control variables. 
Therefore, the procedure can be seen as a 
conservative test strategy for the hypoth-
eses. 7 To cope with unobserved spatial 
heterogeneity unit fixed effect models are 
estimated.
In the empirical analysis, we analyse 
instantaneous spatial interdependencies. 
The estimation of instantaneous spatial 
interdependencies causes several meth-
odological problems. The spatial lag on 
the right hand side of the equation is a 
weighted average of the left hand side 
variable. Therefore the spatial lags are en-
dogenous and covary with the residuals. 
We estimate spatial maximum likelihood 
models since spatial maximum likelihood 
estimation provides consistent and effi-
cient parameter estimates in the case of 
instantaneous interdependencies (Franz-
ese & Hays, 2007, 2008; Hays, 2009). 8 
In the empirical analysis, we proceed 
as follows. First, we analyse for each wel-
fare state programme whether different 
spatial interdependencies do exist over 
the entire period (cf. Table 1, p. 21). Sec-
ond, we take a closer look at the spatial 
7 Additionally, a spatial diagnostic test on the 
residuals of the non-spatial model using OLS 
gives further information concerning the nature 
of the spatial association. The Robust Lagrange 
Multiplier Test against the spatial lag or spatial 
error alternative might indicate whether the 
spatial association is caused by unobserved factors 
(Franzese & Hays, 2007, 2008; Anselin, Bera, et 
al., 1996).
8 All models were estimated with Stata 11.0.
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lags that turned out to be empirically rel-
evant in Table 1 to get a more compre-
hensive understanding of the relevance 
of spatial interdependencies during dif-
ferent sub-periods (cf. Table 2, p. 21). We 
distinguish between the Golden Age and 
the post-Golden Age period. The year in 
which the cross-national average change 
of the programme-specific replacement 
rate turns out to be negative is taken as 
cut off point to distinguish between the 
two periods (cf. Figure 1, p. 16). 9  To test 
whether policy diffusion mechanisms vary 
9 The cut-off point in terms of the unemployment 
and sickness replacement rates is 1975. 1985 is 
the turning point with regard to old age pension 
replacement rates.
between the two sub-periods, we include 
two diffusion variables, one weighting 
social policies during the Golden Age, 
whereas the second one captures social 
policies in the period of retrenchment. 
The variables are generated via cross-
products of the spatial lag with a period 
dummy.
Measurement of the Weight Matrices and the 
Control Variables
Policy diffusion should particularly be 
present between closely related coun-
tries. The literature distinguishes several 
factors which shape the intensity of cross-
national relations and thus the nature of 
interdependencies. Our analysis relies on 
the following three standard measures of 
connectivity between countries. 
First, geographical proximity may in-
crease the intensity of communication 
between countries (Simmons & Elkins, 
2004; Weyland, 2006). Countries located 
in close geographical proximity are di-
rectly accessible to each other and typi-
cally demonstrate a substantial exchange 
of information. A policy enacted next door 
has, therefore, a particular immediacy and 
an exemplifying effect for domestic pol-
icy-makers. Hence, neighbouring states 
are assumed to influence each other more 
strongly than countries located on oppo-
site sides of the globe (Weyland, 2006). To 
take geography into account, the spatial 
weight matrix captures the distance be-
16  02 / 2012WORKING PAPERS
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Fig. 1
tween countries. Each cell of the matrix 
contains the inverse distance between the 
respective national capitals. A small dis-
tance between two countries therefore is 
associated with a high weight. Germany, 
for example, as Austria’s closest neigh-
bour, has the highest weight, while the 
lowest value is assigned to New Zealand 
as the country with the greatest distance 
to Austria. 
Second, cultural propinquity should fa-
cilitate a transnational exchange of infor-
mation. The concept of ‘family of nations’, 
for example, suggests that there exist 
groups of countries closely linked by a 
common language, historical ties, a com-
mon religion or cultural heritage (Castles, 
1998). It is thus more likely that political 
actors will mimic the policy trends preva-
lent within their “family of nations” or cul-
tural reference group. Cultural ties should, 
in principle, give salience to new models 
and policymakers will tend to study them 
closely. Moreover, a common language 
is the lingua franca of information flows. 
In sum, a diffusion of social rights should 
therefore be more pronounced among 
countries sharing a similar cultural back-
ground (cf. Simmons & Elkins, 2004, p. 
175; Lee & Strang, 2006, p. 889). The 
spatial lag indicating the affiliation to the 
same family of nation is a binary variable 
which takes the value one if two countries 
belong to the same family of nations. The 
17
affiliation to a specific family of nations 
was assigned according to Castles (1993) 
and Obinger and Wagschal (2001). 10
Third, connectivity between countries 
can be attributed to close economic ties 
such as trade relations. It is plausible 
that competition and the exchange of in-
formation vary with the intensity of such 
economic interdependencies. Weighting 
replacement rates with the sum of exports 
plus imports between two countries as a 
percentage of the total trade volume al-
lows a check on whether policy diffusion 
between trading partners occurs. The 
United States, for example, is Australia’s 
most important trading partner account-
ing for 25% of Australian total trade vol-
ume. The value in the cell capturing the 
influence of the U.S. on Australia there-
fore is .25. All spatial weight matrices 
were row-standardized by dividing each 
cell in a row by that row’s sum.
Additionally, we include a set of con-
trol variables which are frequently used in 
quantitative welfare state research. Since 
functionalist accounts have argued that 
rising economic wealth should lead to 
greater welfare effort, we use the GDP per 
capita (log) as a measure for a country’s 
level of economic development (Wilen-
sky, 1975). The annual rate of economic 
growth controls for short-term effects 
caused by the business cycle. The share 
of the population aged 65+ and the lev-
10 The Anglo-Saxon family includes Canada, 
Japan, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States, Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, 
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and Switzerland 
are assigned to the continental family. Denmark, 
Finland, Norway and Sweden are members of the 
Nordic family.
el of unemployment (as a percentage of 
the civilian labour force) are controls for 
social need. The index of constitutional 
structures compiled by Henisz (2010) 
measures institutional impacts on welfare 
state development. High values of this 
indicator denote substantial institutional 
barriers for policy change so that a nega-
tive coefficient is expected. Actor prefer-
ences and power resources are measured 
by the percentage of the cabinet seats 
held by Social democratic and Communist 
parties. We also use trade openness of the 
economy as a control. In accordance with 
the efficiency thesis, a negative impact 
on the replacement rates is expected. 
Moreover, basic programme characteris-
tics, notably the mode of financing, may 
influence the capacity of policy-makers 
to alter benefit generosity. There is some 
evidence that benefits financed from con-
tribution payments are much more im-
mune against retrenchment as they are 
seen as a ‘deferred wage’ in exchange 
for future welfare benefits. Likewise, the 
willingness to pay should be higher if 
there is a tight nexus between contribu-
tion payments and welfare benefits. We, 
therefore, expect that contributory funded 
welfare states will provide higher replace-
ment rates. We include a variable that 
measures for each programme the share 
of contribution payments by employees 
and employers as a percentage of total 
funding. Finally, the 5-year lagged level of 
the programme-related replacement rate 
is used to control for different stages of 
programme maturation, path dependency 
and common trends. The measurement of 
all variables is described in detail in the 
appendix.
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itly distinguishing between the Golden 
Age and the more recent era of welfare 
state transformation. In four models, the 
coefficients of the spatial lags are statisti-
cally significant at least at the 10 per cent 
level. However, policy diffusion varies by 
programme. For pensions, representing 
the biggest welfare state programme in 
virtually all nations, we find a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient for the 
spatial lag mapping cultural affiliations 
between nations (model II). This suggests 
that countries orient themselves towards 
the benefit levels of those countries which 
belong to the same family of nations. By 
contrast, the spatial lags capturing geo-
graphical proximity (model I) and trade 
relations (model III) fail to reach statisti-
cal significance.  
While in the field of pensions cultural 
affinities across nations seem to matter, 
geographical proximity influences the 
diffusion of benefit generosity offered by 
unemployment insurance. The estimated 
impact is negative, however. This is in 
line with the studies on labour market 
spending by Franzese and Hays (2006) 
and Kemmerling (2007) who interpret 
the negative sign of the spatial lag as in-
dicative of free-riding behaviour among 
neighbours. 
The findings related to sickness ben-
efits also reveal a negative impact of geo-
graphic proximity. In addition economic 
relationships matter for benefit generos-
ity (model IX). Again, the coefficient of 
the spatial lag is negative and statistically 
significant. Broadly speaking, if trade 
partners increase sickness cash benefits 
by ten percentage points, the replacement 
rate in the focal country decreases by 3.3 
percentage points.     
Overall, this evidence supports our 
first hypothesis that spatial interdepend-
encies have to be considered in com-
parative welfare state analysis. Previous 
inquiries have therefore neglected an 
important factor influencing welfare state 
dynamics. A disregard of spatial interde-
pendencies, however, may have serious 
consequences since it likely leads to bi-
ased estimators.  
Moreover, the findings have revealed 
that in most cases countries did not move 
in the same direction in terms of welfare 
generosity. Positive feedbacks can be only 
observed for pensions and are restricted 
to countries affiliated to the same family 
of nations. The spatial lags for the remain-
ing programmes show a negative sign. A 
plausible but somewhat speculative inter-
pretation of this finding is that diffusion 
is driven by competitive pressure. More 
specifically, this evidence might indicate 
the presence of beggar-thy-neighbour 
strategies. In contrast to pensions, un-
employment and sickness cash benefits 
cover the working age population with di-
rect implications for labour costs. Hence 
these programmes are more likely subject 
Table 1 (p. 21) presents the estimation re-
sults for each programme without explic-
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to the strategic behaviour of governments 
in an international competitive environ-
ment. This interpretation is supported by 
the fact that significant negative relations 
of this kind are only relevant among eco-
nomically related countries and nations 
located in close geographical proximity. 
A general problem, however, is that the 
standard measures of connectivity like ge-
ographical distance and cultural proxim-
ity are to some extent catch-all indicators 
that measure multiple kinds of connec-
tions between countries. 11 For example, 
one may argue that geography overlaps to 
some extent with trade relations and cul-
tural affinities.
 The results for the control variables 
are basically in line with the theoretical 
assumptions, if the findings across all four 
programmes are compared. As expect-
ed, the 5-years lagged replacement rate 
is consistently positive and statistically 
significant at the 1 per cent level in all 
models. Furthermore, rich countries offer 
higher replacement rates since the coef-
ficient of the GDP per capita (log) is posi-
tive in all models and significant at the 5 
per cent level in models I to III (pensions). 
The impact of GDP growth is positive but 
insignificant in all models except for mod-
el IX. Furthermore, and in accordance 
with the efficiency thesis, strong involve-
ment in the global market corresponds 
with lower benefit generosity (particularly 
11 We also tested alternative measurements of 
geographical proximity and cultural affiliation 
such as length of common border, the presence 
of a common border or a common language and 
EU-membership. In each case, the coefficients of 
the spatial lags are statistically insignificant (not 
reported - results can be provided upon request).
in terms of pensions). With the exception 
of unemployment benefits, contribution 
financed programmes provide higher re-
placement rates. In terms of pensions, 
the coefficient is significant at the 10 per 
cent level. In contrast to our theoretical 
assumption, there is no influence of po-
litical institutions. Moreover, there are 
some programme-specific results. A high 
percentage of cabinet seats held by leftist 
parties is associated with lower pension 
benefits. In addition, countries with high 
rates of unemployment offer lower unem-
ployment benefits. Hardly surprisingly, it 
would seem that a generous replacement 
rate is difficult to maintain in times of high 
unemployment. 
The previous analysis focused on 
a long time span ranging from 1960 to 
2000. It is well-known that the oils shocks 
in the 1970s caused a turning point in 
welfare state development (see also Fig-
ure 1 above). While in the Golden Age the 
overall developmental pattern was exten-
sion of benefit generosity, the more recent 
period is also characterised by benefit 
cutbacks. Therefore we now examine the 
relevance of policy diffusion in differ-
ent phases of welfare state development. 
We distinguish between two sub-periods 
(1960-80 and 1980-2000, respectively) 
and re-estimate those models of Table 1 
showing a statistically significant spatial 
lag coefficient. We include a spatial lag for 
each sub-period. According to our second 
hypothesis policy diffusion should be of 
less importance during the Golden Age.
Table 2 (p. 21) reports the empirical 
results and reveals several remarkable 
findings. The spatial lag coefficient re-
lated to the Golden Age period achieves 
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statistical significance in all models while 
all coefficients of the spatial lags remain 
insignificant in the second period. This 
astonishing result indicates that spatial 
interactions shaped the expansion of the 
welfare state during the Golden Age rath-
er than the more recent period and holds 
for all programmes and irrespective of 
the imputed connectivity between coun-
tries. The insignificant coefficients for the 
spatial lag in the post-Golden Age period 
are at first glance counter-intuitive, given 
the deep changes in the international po-
litical economy and growing international 
communication. A possible explanation 
for the period-specific findings could be 
the, arguably, greater leeway for policy 
change in the expansionary economic cli-
mate of the Golden Age than in the subse-
quent era of austerity. This also includes 
the possibility of playing a lone hand in 
social affairs. In addition, policy-makers 
had more scope to strategically respond 
to policy choices of related countries in 
the early post-war decades. By contrast, 
the autonomy for policy-making in the fol-
lowing period was constrained by grow-
ing socio-economic problem pressure. 
Governments increasingly had to respond 
to similar challenges but without incur-
ring electoral blame. These conflictive 
economic and political constraints may 
explain the insignificant coefficients in 
the second period for which we neither 
find a downward spiral in benefit provi-
sion nor positive feedback effects among 
countries. In any case, more systematic 
research is needed to further examine 
the driving mechanisms underlying policy 
diffusion at different stages of welfare 
state development. 
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Table 2. 
Dependent variable: Replacement Rate  
 PENSIONS UNEMPLOYMENT SICKNESS 
Independent variables I II IV 
Spatial Lag –Families  
Golden Age  
 .152+ 
 (.092)   
Spatial Lag – Families  
Retrenchment  
.083 
(.119)   
Spatial Lag - Trade 
Golden Age    
-.347* 
(.160) 
Spatial Lag - Trade 
Retrenchment    
-.225 
(.148) 
Spatial Lag - Distance  
Golden Age   
-.698** 
(.275) 
-.359+ 
(.189) 
Spatial Lag - Distance 
Retrenchment   
-.263 
(.254) 
-.198 
(.200) 
Notes: All regressions include fixed period and unit effects; those coefficient estimates 
and the coefficients of the control variables are suppressed to conserve space. *** 
Significant at the .01 level; ** at the .05 level; + at the .10 level 
Conclusion
For many years, macro-quantitative wel-
fare state research has been afflicted 
with a ‘methodological nationalism’ (e.g. 
Zürn, 2005) in the sense that countries 
were treated as independent units. In 
line with the recent ‘spatial turn’ in com-
parative public policy studies, this paper 
has examined whether, in the post-war 
period, benefit generosity in 18 Western 
democracies was shaped by welfare state 
generosity in other countries. We were 
able to show that policy diffusion is pre-
sent but varies by programme and over 
time. More specifically, three findings 
stand out. First, policy diffusion has to 
be taken into account in empirical stud-
ies analysing cross-national variation in 
welfare state generosity. Many previous 
empirical inquiries have, thus, ignored 
an important source of social policy vari-
ation in advanced democracies. Second 
and rather surprisingly, the diffusion of 
benefit generosity was particularly rel-
evant during the Golden Age, i.e. a period 
with considerable autonomy for national 
policy-makers. It has been of lesser im-
portance in the Silver Age of the welfare 
state (Taylor-Gooby, 2002) that is charac-
terised by less favourable economic con-
ditions and mounting social challenges. 
Third, policy diffusion mechanisms vary 
by programme. Positive feedback effects 
within a family of nations play an impor-
tant role in terms of pensions which ab-
sorb the lion’s share of social expenditure 
in most countries. In contrast, diffusion 
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in unemployment and sickness insurance 
seem to be mainly driven by competitive 
pressures. 
Some of these findings are startling 
and certainly require further research. 
One avenue of future research should 
pay more attention to the factors respon-
sible for the strong spatial interactions 
during the Golden Age identified in this 
paper. Moreover, our findings for the 
post-Golden Age period are preliminary 
as the SCIP data is only publicly available 
until 2000. Hence the 2000s, a period of 
marked welfare state transformation and 
growing EU impacts (e.g. via the Open 
Method of Co-ordination) on national wel-
fare state reforms, are spared from our 
analysis. Furthermore and independent 
of the period of analysis, more research is 
required on how social policy diffusion is 
conditioned by or interacts with domestic 
political factors such as power resources, 
party ideology and institutional settings. 
We hope that this paper can serve as a 
starting point to address these issues in 
future research.
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Variable Description Source 
Replacement Rate 
Net replacement rate for an average production worker 
(APW) 
Unemployment and Sickness programme: average of 
four components: a) a single person vs. b) a four-person 
family, and c) short term (first week with benefits) vs. 
d) long term (26 weeks with benefits).  
Old age pensions: average of the APW replacement rate 
for a single person and a couple 
Korpi and Palme, 
2007 (SCIP) 
Trade Openness Sum of imports and exports as a percentage of GDP  in constant prices (2005) 
Heston et al., 2009 
(PWT 6.3) 
Leftist Government 
One year lagged five-year-average of cabinet seats of 
Social democratic and communist parties as a 
percentage of  total cabinet posts  
Data kindly provided 
by Manfred G. 
Schmidt, University 
of Heidelberg 
Institutions 
PolconIII: Index of political constraints that estimates 
the feasibility of policy change (for details see Henisz 
(2002) Henisz, 2010 
Share of social security 
contributions in 
financing 
Share of contribution payments by employees and 
employers as a percentage of total funding 
Korpi and Palme, 
2007 (SCIP) 
Unemployment rate Unemployment rate as a percentage of civilian labour force 
Armingeon, 
Leimgruber, et al., 
2008 for the period 
from 1960-2000; For 
the years 1950 and 
1955:  Maddison, 
1995 
Elderly population 65+ Elderly population age 65 and over as a percentage of the total population 
Data on elderly: 
Korpi & Palme, 
2007 (SCIP) 
Data on population: 
Heston, Summers,  
et al., 2009 (PWT 
6.3)  
GDP per capita (log) 
Logarithm of real GDP per capita (Constant Prices: 
Chain series) (2005) PWT 6.3  
Missing values for Germany 1950-65 were estimated 
using the growth rate of the  real GDP per capita 
provided by Maddison (1995) 
Heston, Summers, et 
al., 2009 (PWT 6.3);  
Maddison, 1995.  
GDP growth 
Compound annual growth rate of real GDP per capita 
(1950-55 etc.); Missing values for Germany 1950-65 
were interpolated  using the growth rate of the  real 
GDP per capita provided by Maddison (1995) 
Heston, Summers, et 
al., 2009 (PWT 6.3);  
Maddison, 1995.   
Weighting matrix - 
distance Inverse distance between the capitals in km 
http.//www.globetrot
ter.de/ 
Weighting matrix - 
trade
Sum of exports and imports of goods and services 
between two countries a s percentage of the total trade 
volume  
IMF Direction of 
Trade Statistics 
(various years) 
Weighting matrix – 
families of nations 
Binary variable (1=affiliation to the same family of 
nation; 0=affiliation to different families of nations) 
Castles, 1998; 
Obinger & 
Wagschal, 2001 
Appendix: Measurement and Sources of the 
Variables
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Bismarckian welfare states taken as ideal types are based on the insurance principle which 
relates to gainful (dependent) employment. They aim at securing the once achieved life stand-
ard and status of the employeecitizen (and his family). An average salary earned as result of 
continuous and fulltime employment therefore represents a precondition for a decent level 
of social protection in countries like Germany, Belgium, Austria and France. As protection 
against ‘new social risks’ like care periods is underdeveloped, carers have to rely on their fam-
ily context – more specifically, marriage – as source of social security.
Comparative welfare state research has demonstrated a growing interest in the transforma-
tion of the Bismarckian welfare state as this welfare state type was considered as mostly 
resistant to change, despite the increasing visibility of its dysfunctionality. Whilst retrench-
ment is widely acknowledged as a main trend of change, the expansion of social insurances 
schemes, which is in contradiction to this, has been rather underresearched. This study aims 
at analysing the expansion in terms of the adjustment of social insurances to the integration 
of ‘new social risks’. It suggests comparing policies aimed at the support for carers of both 
children and elderly people which have been institutionalised within the past two decades. 
This manifold comparative analysis underlines three insights. First, the male breadwinner 
model has, despite its partial ‘modernisation’ remained a main road to social security cover-
age for carers, especially in old age in all four countries. By that, a core feature of conserva-
tive-corporatist welfare states remains largely untouched. Secondly, the introduction of leave 
schemes for carers has in most cases been accompanied by the extension of social insurance 
Silke Bothfeld 
Kindererziehung und 
Pflegezeiten: 
Wie anpassungsfähig sind die 
Sozialversicherungssysteme?
Deutschland im internationalen Vergleich
ZeS-Arbeitspapier Nr. 03/2012  
Zentrum für Sozialpolitik, Universität Bremen
coverage on equal terms with regular employees. This is, however, less true for persons who 
care for elderly persons than for parents, to whom during their leave periods the regular rules 
apply. Thirdly, the international comparison revealed the development of idiosyncratic domes-
tic policies. Consequently, a policy regime which would provide a decent level of protection to 
carers, would combine different ‘good practices’ from all of the four countries researched in 
this study. Any policy aimed at extending social insurance coverage to carers may fill some 
crucial gaps. However, higher labour market risks, reduced income, or upward mobility 
chances and the loss of seniority benefits due to career breaks or working time reduction will 
remain relevant mid- and long-term disadvantages that carers will have to bear.
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